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THE UNFAIRNESS OF THE  
MISNAMED “FAIRNESS FOR ALL” ACT 
 
Ryan T. Anderson1 and Robert P. George2 
 
Intransigence is a vice, but there is no virtue in accepting bad 
compromises.  The “Fairness for All” legislation is a bad compromise—and as a 
result, would be a misguided response to the Supreme Court’s Bostock decision.  To 
show this is not to question the good faith of the bill’s advocates, with whom we 
have been in friendly dialogue for years.3  It’s merely to note that despite the 
undoubted goodwill of the bill’s proponents (and despite its name), the bill is 
grievously unfair.  Its protections for religious liberty are insufficient.  And they 
come at the price of legally enshrining a misguided sexual and gender ideology—
which would license officials to punish citizens who dissent from secular 
progressive orthodoxy.4  
These costs are unsurprising: from the start, the compromise sought was 
misframed in two ways.  
First, there was a woeful mismatch in ambitions: The “conservative” side failed 
even to seek protections for many crucial interests apart from religious liberty that 
are imperiled by the bill’s antidiscrimination component.  As Stewart and Schaerr 
stress, FFA is narrowly focused on “religious liberty and LGBTQ rights”5 as the 
result of “negotiations between conservative religious groups and LGBTQ rights 
groups”6 designed to protect “their core interests.”7  But religious freedom isn’t the 
only interest here.  What about women’s and girls’ privacy, safety, and equality, or 
the wellbeing of children with gender dysphoria?  FFA’s approach is narrow and 
selective.  A sound approach would be inclusive and holistic, considering all of the 
interests and people who would be harmed by the proposed changes to civil rights 
law. 
 
1 Ryan T. Anderson is the William E. Simon Senior Research Fellow in American Principles and Public 
Policy at The Heritage Foundation and the St. John Paul II Teaching Fellow in Social Thought at the 
University of Dallas.  
2 Robert P. George is McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the James Madison 
Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University. 
3 We have also joined the academic discussions: Both of us participated in a 2017 conference on FFA at 
Yale Law School, and one of us contributed a chapter critiquing its approach to the book cited by Stewart and 
Schaerr.  See Ryan T. Anderson, Challenges to True Fairness for All: How SOGI Laws are Unlike Civil 
Liberties and Other Nondiscrimination Laws and How to Craft Better Policy and Get Nondiscrimination Laws 
Right, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND 361 (William 
Eskridge, Jr. and Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370373.  
4 Ryan T. Anderson, Shields, Not Swords, 35 NAT’L AFF. 74 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141908.  
5 Chris Stewart & Gene Schaerr, Why Conservative Religious Organizations and Believers Should Support 
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Second, while the compromise purports to allow both sides to “live and let 
live,”8 it does not and could not do that, because only one side of the deal involves a 
form of legal freedom; the other side involves a form of legal coercion.  By 
definition, antidiscrimination laws coerce some citizens on behalf of others—
whereas religious liberty limits government to protect the personal freedom of all.  
Antidiscrimination policies—sometimes justifiably, to be sure—use legal force to 
make some people, in some domains, live by the majority’s values; religious liberty 
protects everyone’s interest in living by his or her own convictions.  Pairing a 
coercive norm with a liberty exception is not live and let live.  A true live-and-let-
live approach would leave LGBTQ-identifying people free to live by their beliefs, 
but not “free” to use legal mechanisms to force others to act as if they shared those 
beliefs.  
 
Elevating “sexual orientation and gender identity” to a protected class in the 
Civil Rights Act isn’t about “live and let live” at all.  It’s about legally enforcing 
new norms of sexuality nationwide, with limited “spaces” of freedom for some 
religious actors.  FFA effectively helps brand alternatives to the favored ideology as 
bigotry while carving out a limited “right to discriminate” for some “bigots.”  This 
will do harm that Stewart and Schaerr fail to grapple with—harm to people’s 
privacy, safety, equality, and physical and mental wellbeing, along with forms of 
liberty—not just for believers, but for all dissenters from progressive gender 
ideology.9 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock will undoubtedly impose some—though 
perhaps not all—of these harms on the nation.  (We say perhaps not all because the 
Court’s simplistic logic on “sex” discrimination does not directly add SOGI to all of 
our civil rights laws, and therefore many questions remain.10)  Any effective 
response to the Court’s ruling needs to focus not solely on religious liberty, but on 
the substantive harms that could come.  This means we need legislation that clarifies 
what does, and what does not, constitute unlawful “discrimination” on these issues.    
 
A Better Approach 
 
Stewart and Schaerr observe that “[v]enerable religious beliefs regarding 
marriage, family, gender, and sexuality are routinely denounced as ignorance and 
even dangerous bigotry.”11  They rightly fear that these beliefs may be subject to the 
“[l]egal and social forces” that we use to “punish racist expressions and practices 
severely.”12  But they don’t see that FFA would contribute to this disturbing trend.  
 
8 Id. 
9 Ryan T. Anderson, A Brave New World of Transgender Policy, 41 HARV. J. OF L. AND PUB.POL’Y 1 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3113625.  
10 Ryan T. Anderson, The Simplistic Logic of Justice Neil Gorsuch’s Account of Sex Discrimination, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2020, 1:28PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-the-simplistic-
logic-of-justice-neil-gorsuchs-account-of-sex-discrimination/. 
11 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 139. 
12 Id. at 147. 
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Under FFA, acting on what we and Stewart and Scherr hold to be true beliefs about 
sexuality would be legally viewed as “discrimination.”  
Stewart and Schaerr write that FFA “will certainly teach that unjust 
discrimination against LGBT persons is unlawful and wrong.”13  But the bill never 
begins to distinguish unjust discrimination from valid and honorable dissent from 
progressive ideology.  FFA leaves its central term—“discrimination”—to the whims 
of government agencies and judges.  And we’ve seen how officials interpret and 
apply these policies: men who identify as women must be allowed in women-only 
spaces, boys who identify as girls must be allowed to compete in the girls’ athletic 
competitions, healthcare plans must pay for gender-transition procedures, doctors 
and hospitals must perform them, adoption agencies may not seek only married 
moms and dads to care for children in need, and wedding professionals must lend 
their talents to same-sex “weddings.”  No one can claim ignorance of these unjust 
applications.  We need policy that challenges these changes, rather than “regularizes 
and refines” them, as Stewart and Schaerr admit FFA does.  
It is particularly odd for Stewart and Schaerr to complain that conservatives 
“oppose any compromise with the LGBT community on the hope they can hold out 
forever”14 when one of us, a senior research fellow at the country’s largest 
conservative public policy institution, has proposed a better approach to these 
questions.15  We don’t oppose compromise, only bad compromises.  Stewart and 
Schaerr charge conservatives with indulging a “dangerous fantasy,” but it’s a 
fantasy to think that making “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” protected 
classes will promote “live and let live,” not coercion and harassment. 
A better approach, especially in light of the Court’s Bostock decision, would 
carefully consider the needs of LGBT-identifying people that require a policy 
response, and then target legislation at serving those needs.  It would explicitly 
define what’s unlawful and protect everyone’s freedom to engage in legitimate 
actions based on the convictions that we are created male and female and that male 
and female are created for each other.  It would protect parental rights, women’s 
privacy and safety, medical professionals’ conscience rights, and the free speech 
and religious liberty rights of wedding vendors and other professionals.  This would 
leave all Americans free to act on their convictions.  
We find it peculiar—indeed, disturbing—that Stewart and Schaerr claim that a 
“bill that protected every religious person or interest from any burden occasioned by 
LGBTQ rights would largely neuter the bar on SOGI discrimination.”16  This 
suggests that what religious objectors seek is the freedom to violate people’s 
genuine rights, rather than the freedom to live by honorable beliefs.  Truly fair 
legislation would not burden any honorable activity by religious actors—and non-
religious actors.  Fair legislation would prohibit unjust discrimination while not 
burdening good actions by clarifying what does and does not constitute unjust 
discrimination. 
 
13 Id. at 196. 
14 Id. at 139. 
15 Anderson, supra note 3.  
16 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 157. 
  
4 Journal of Legislation Online Supplement 2020 
Consider a parallel.  When Congress passed Title IX’s ban on sex-based 
discrimination in education, the implementing regulations clarified that sex-specific 
housing, bathrooms, and locker rooms are not unlawful discrimination.  This was 
not a carve-out for religious entities; all institutions could have sex-specific 
facilities, because doing so is not invidiously discriminatory at all.  Likewise with 
abortion: in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the Supreme Court 
resolutely rejected the idea that pro-lifers commit invidious discrimination against 
women: “Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there are 
common and respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of, or 
condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concerning), women.”17  
Thus, local, state, and federal laws were enacted to protect pro-lifers’ rights: 
The Church and Weldon Amendments have protected pro-life medical personnel 
refusing to perform or assist with abortions, and the Hyde Amendment and Mexico 
City policy have prevented taxpayer funding of abortion.  Antidiscrimination law 
was not used to brand pro-life citizens as bigots subject only to exemptions for 
certain religious institutions. 
Here, too, in the wake of Bostock any truly fair legislation would make explicit 
that it’s lawful to act on the convictions that we are created male and female, and 
that male and female are created for each other—for example, by supporting 
marriage as the conjugal union of husband and wife. Likewise, a fair bill would 
expressly provide that no institution has to let males compete against females in 
sports or use women-only locker-rooms and shelters.  It would explicitly say that no 
physician has to engage in so-called “gender-affirming” care, and that no child can 
be denied assistance with accepting and identifying with his or her body.  These 
measures would protect genuine human interests, not merely specialized religious 
interests.  
 
FFA is the opposite of clear on these points.  Over and over, the protections for 
“LGBTQ rights” are bold and explicit, and those for “religious liberty” are 
convoluted and implicit.  Thus, it takes Stewart and Schaerr over 5,000 words to 
explain how FFA would protect adoption agencies that believe children deserve 
both a mom and a dad.  And on wedding vendors, Stewart and Schaerr actually say 
that FFA’s “drafters . . . had a choice whether to ignore the issue, expressly address 
it, or use structural mechanisms to address it without calling it out,” and “chose the 
latter.”18  
The obfuscation guarantees extensive litigation—and the results are anyone’s 
guess, especially with a Court as unreliable as the Bostock court.  That is legislative 
malpractice.  And it ensures that the teaching function of FFA is not what they hope.  
It will not promote public support for religious liberty.  It will effectively teach that 
religious people “discriminate”—the kind of thing practiced and supported by 
bigots—but that some rule of statutory construction gives them a limited license to 
do so.  This is reinforced by Stewart and Schaerr’s own discussion of the adoption 
 
17 Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). 
18 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 171. 
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issue: “The general rule is that any entity receiving federal financial assistance for 
performing adoption and foster care services must avoid discriminating against a 
prospective parent or child on the basis of … sexual orientation, and gender 
identity.”19  But they propose to set up an indirect funding mechanism to do an end-
run around that “general rule,” whereby an “agency that receives federal funding in 
this way is not bound by the same nondiscrimination rules as an agency that 
receives federal funding directly.”20  So “discrimination” is unacceptable when 
funded directly, but acceptable when funded indirectly? 
Likewise, Stewart and Schaerr write: “To be sure, after FFA, federal law would 
teach that secular commercial spheres should be fair and open to everyone 
regardless of … SOGI,”21 implying that religious spheres get to be domains of 
unfairness.  They repeatedly write as if choices based on sound convictions about 
human sexuality amount to “discrimination,” to be permitted in a few specifically 
religious contexts anyway.  As they put it, FFA provides “protections and 
allowances for religious spaces and voices.”22  How generous.  This almost ensures 
the further ghettoization of orthodox religious believers and the further 
marginalization of the truth about human sexuality.  In the public sphere, 
progressive sexual ideology reigns supreme; in specifically religious private 
institutional spheres, dissenters from that ideology can find limited respite.  This is 




FFA also engages in legislative malpractice in its handling of “gender identity,” 
imposing serious liability without defining the offense.  What exactly would be 
banned as “discrimination” based on “gender identity”? Can the bill’s drafters and 
sponsors tell us what that will mean long term?  Can they tell us what it would 
legally ban or mandate today?  Advocates insist that gender identity is fluid and 
exists along a spectrum, with varieties currently including “gender-hybrid” and 
“gender ambidextrous.”  What activities based on these statuses would get 
protection?  It is irresponsible to rewrite our civil rights laws to make “gender 
identity” a protected class when we cannot even define what gender identity is, or 
what gender identities there are.  Notably, the Bostock decision did not use the 
language of “gender identity” but of “transgender status.”23  FFA goes well beyond 
even the errors of Bostock.  
Stewart and Schaerr caricature these concerns: “Sometimes critics allege that 
protecting gender identity means forced accommodation of people who will switch 
their gender identity regularly, even daily, in an effort to abuse the protections for 
nefarious ends.  The image they conjure is of teenage boys announcing one day that 
 
19 Id. at 187. 
20 Id. at 186. 
21 Id. at 198. 
22 Id. 
23 Ryan T. Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Mistaken and Misguided Sex Discrimination Ruling, PUB.  
DISCOURSE (June 16, 2020), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/06/65024/. 
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they are ‘girls’ so they can gawk in the girls’ locker room, returning to their male 
status when the hijinks are done.”24  They cite no examples of such critics.  They 
should know better.  When Schaerr was legal counsel defending North Carolina’s 
HB2—the so-called “bathroom bill”—he submitted expert testimony from an FBI 
sex-crimes specialist on how “gender identity”-based access would increase risks to 
safety and privacy.  Why he now joins in mischaracterizing these concerns is 
puzzling.  And it does nothing to clarify what legal duties would be owed under 
FFA to people who are “gender fluid,” “genderflux,” “genderqueer,” “trigender,” 
“polygender,” “non-binary,” etc.  Even Bostock didn’t go this far. 
Stewart and Schaerr note that many jurisdictions already entitle people to “use 
the bathroom or locker room of their gender identity”25 and allow gender-dysphoric 
males to compete in female sports.  But this is just what many people want to stop, 
or to prevent from starting in their communities.  FFA would mandate such 
practices nationwide, in all public and nearly all private institutions.26  
FFA also does not adequately address concerns about medical care.  The FFA 
text allows doctors to provide a service or treatment “on the same medical terms or 
criteria applicable to individuals needing that service [or] treatment . . . , without 
regard to protected class status.”27  But this completely sidesteps the debate about 
care for persons with gender dysphoria.  That debate is precisely about what counts 
as proper “medical terms or criteria” or discrimination.  Stewart and Schaerr 
distinguish28 “purely cosmetic breast augmentations or reductions” from 
“augmentation or reconstruction” for “therapeutic” reasons, but this begs the 
question of whether gender transition is cosmetic, or is rather therapeutic, as leading 
pro-“transition” advocates insist. 
Activists now draw a parallel between “transition” procedures and life-saving 
medical care.  Even for children.  One physician explained to CNN: “If your child 
had asthma and was turning blue, you wouldn’t deny them their albuterol inhaler or 
say ‘let’s wait.’  If this were cancer or diabetes, we wouldn’t be having this 
conversation, but people get funny when it comes to medical care when gender is 
involved, and that’s harmful.”29  Gender ideology advocates argue that far from 
being cosmetic, “transition”-related care is life-saving.  So if you provide life-saving 
breast reductions to cancer patients but not those with gender dysphoria, activists 
say you “discriminate” based on “gender identity.”  FFA strengthens their hand. 
 
 
24 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 160. 
25 Id. at 202. 
26 Stewart and Schaerr explain why: “FFA exempts religious schools from this mandate to the extent sex-
separated sports are important to a schools’ religious mission.  While this may be a cultural issue, it is not a 
religious liberty threat.” Yes, but the decision to ignore “cultural issues” is a design flaw of FFA, its failure to 
take a holistic approach to serving the good of all—the common good—and not just that of churches and 
religious institutions.  Id. at 204. 
27 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 169 n.113. 
28 Id. at 170. 
29 Jen Christensen, Parents want custody to stop transgender teen having hormone treatment, CNN (Feb. 
13, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/13/health/transgender-teen-medical-custody-fight/index.html. 
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Indeed one aspect of FFA accepts wholesale the transgender activists’ 
perspective on proper care.  FFA states that an “entity unlawfully discriminates 
against a child by” treating a child “inconsistently with the child’s gender identity” 
or by providing “any practice or treatment that seeks to change the child’s … gender 
identity.”30  So children must be affirmed in their gender confusion, and adults may 
not attempt to help them—all in the name of … fairness?  That is outrageous.  The 
bill limits these provisions to foster children and others in the state’s custody.  But if 
this is what “fairness” requires for those children, why not for all?  This logic will 
play itself out, with parents depicted as oppressors and abusers for refusing to go 
along with the claim that their gender confused little girl is actually a little boy who 
needs puberty blockers, cross sex hormones, and eventually amputations.31  This, 
too, goes well beyond Bostock—and serves as another reminder that FFA would 
enshrine SOGI laws deeper and further into our legal system than the Court has 
already. 
 
False analogy to Religious liberty/nondiscrimination  
 
Stewart and Schaerr defend FFA’s structure and pedagogical impact with a 
flawed analogy to religious liberty and to religious antidiscrimination laws (they are 
not always clear on the distinction).  On religious liberty, they write: “When for 
example an organization of Southern Baptists or other evangelical Christians 
supports the right of Jews and Seventh-day Adventists to worship on Saturday, no 
one seriously thinks they are somehow weakening their own theological 
commitment to Sunday worship.”32  That is correct.  The Southern Baptists are 
acting for the sake of religious liberty, a real human right.  But nothing similar is 
true in the SOGI context: there is no “sexual self-definition” or “erotic freedom” 
human right.  
And here again, Stewart and Schaerr miss the point we opened with, about the 
difference between guarding all people from governmental coercion, and allowing 
people to enlist the government in coercing others.33  Religious liberty laws say that 
Orthodox Jews have the right to be authentically Jewish, Latter-day Saints to be 
LDS, Muslims to be Muslim, etc.  But SOGI laws require other people to perform 
actions that endorse, support, and facilitate sexual practices and self-identities they 
do not believe in.  These laws aren’t about allowing “people to act in ways that 
others disagree with,”34 as Stewart and Schaerr write; instead they force those who 
disagree into complying with the beliefs of others.  Just ask Jack Phillips.  Or 
Baronelle Stutzman.  Or Catholic adoption agencies. 
 
30 H.R. 5331, 116th Cong., § 3 (3)(b)(2)(E) (2019). 
31 See Ryan T. Anderson and Robert P. George, Physical Interventions on the Bodies of Children to 
‘Affirm’ their ‘Gender Identity’ Violate Sound Medical Ethics and Should be Prohibited, PUB. DISCOURSE 
(Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2019/12/58839/. 
32 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 148. 
33 See Anderson, supra note 4.  
34 Stewart & Schaerr, supra note 5 at 140. 
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Stewart and Schaerr’s analogy to religious antidiscrimination laws fails for the 
same reason.  They write that a law forbidding employers to exclude Catholics 
“does not mean that the law, much less people of other faiths or no faith at all, 
endorse Catholicism.  It means we have decided that religion shouldn’t be held 
against someone in those areas.  The same is true of SOGI.”35  If only. 
They are right that bans on religious discrimination aren’t used to force 
religious groups to violate their religious beliefs, or secular organizations to violate 
their own convictions.  For example, while Planned Parenthood cannot refuse to 
hire a pro-choice Jew because he wears a yarmulke, it can refuse to hire a pro-life 
Jew, even when his pro-life convictions flow from his understanding of Jewish faith 
and his Jewish identity.  This leaves Planned Parenthood free to make reasonable 
distinctions based on its convictions and mission, even when its resulting policies 
have a disparate impact on people who have a certain religious identity or engage in 
certain sorts of religiously motivated conduct.  
By contrast, SOGI laws are used to impose adherence to an orthodoxy—e.g., to 
force Catholic schools to employ people who undermine Catholic principles of 
sexual morality, or Evangelical bakers to celebrate messages about marriage 
contrary to their faith, or Catholic Charities to violate its faith-based commitment to 
finding a mom and a dad for every child in need. 
So it is sheer, groundless assertion to claim, as Stewart and Schaerr do, that 
FFA “does not, contrary to conservative critics, teach that a single SOGI ideology 
governs all of American life.”36  By making SOGI a protected class, FFA would 
constitute a national endorsement of a certain viewpoint about sexuality and 
empower officials to punish those acting on dissenting views. 
Moving the Discussion the Forward 
 
None of the criticisms of FFA we’ve put forth in this essay is new.  So it is 
baffling why Stewart and Schaerr’s lengthy article fails to quote a single actual 
critic of FFA, relying instead on caricatures and strawmen—and imputations of bad 
faith.  They say that “[r]ight-wing advocacy groups” opposed to FFA “are deeply 
invested—ideologically and institutionally—in this conflict” and “may embrace and 
even relish such fights.”37  We do not.  Nor do we know anyone working on these 
issues who does.  Stewart and Schaerr give no examples.  To impugn FFA’s 
opponents as venal or conflict-loving is wrong, just as it would be wrong for FFA’s 
critics to brand religious groups or individuals who support FFA as “sell-outs” or 
“cowards” who desire to curry favor with secular progressive elites. 
Stewart and Schaerr also claim that “important center-right voices in the 
religious freedom community have endorsed” FFA, but they never say if any 
“important” voices have criticized it.  They do say that “some conservative religious 
groups have harshly denounced”38 FFA.  This gives the impression that Catholic and 
 
35 Id. at 197. 
36 Id. at 198. 
37 Id. at 143. 
38 Id. at 196. 
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Southern Baptist leaders, among other opponents, far from raising legitimate 
concerns, have offered only “harsh denunciations.”  That is not true.  Or fair. 
Indeed, Stewart and Schaerr close with some truly unfortunate rhetoric about 
critics of FFA: 
 
The best response to conservative critics is a reality check. . . . [W]hat 
is their plan for preserving religious liberty from the threat of laws like the 
Equality Act?  Deny the threat, hoping for legislative gridlock forever 
despite tectonic shifts in public opinion?  Hope the public grows tired of 
LGBT rights and the whole issue just goes away?  More one-sided religious 
freedom bills or bathroom bills, so more states can be firebombed in the 
media and boycotted by corporate America as anti-LGBTQ?  Sweeping 
exemptions for everyone who might be inclined to discriminate, so the 
SOGI nondiscrimination rule applies only to those who never would in the 
first place?  Trust the Supreme Court to hand out exemptions to anyone 
who wants one?39  
 
Religious and policy organizations opposing FFA have not done so out of 
ignorance, a failure to grapple with reality, or a perverse attraction to conflict.  They 
have opposed it—as we have—because they judge it misguided.  
Religious communities are concerned with transcendent matters, but most also 
seek to promote the temporal common good.  Doing so in a culture so often hostile 
to authentic flourishing is not easy.  We would never accuse supporters of FFA of 
seeking to save face or win liberal media accolades.  They are doing what they 
believe to be in the public interest.  But so are groups who find FFA’s selective 
focus and structural flaws unacceptable.  
Only the truth can promote authentic flourishing and peace.  Faith and 
reconciliation detached from the truth are counterfeits.  While we work to find a 
way of addressing legal and cultural conflicts that is fair for all, we must not allow 
the truth to be treated in law as the law treats bigotry, or to surrender vital principles 
of public policy that are central to the common good. 
In the aftermath of the Court’s Bostock decision, we need to define explicitly 
what sort of conduct counts as unlawful, while also protecting everyone’s freedom 
to engage in legitimate actions based on the convictions that we are created male 
and female and that male and female are created for each other.  Religious liberty is 
an important human right, but we must also protect parental rights, women’s 
privacy and safety, and medical professionals’ conscience rights.  We must refuse to 
impose a misguided gender ideology on the nation.  This holistic and inclusive 




39 Id. at 206. 
